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CURING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: 
RESOLUTION 1502 
In Congo it happens all the time. In Uganda it happens all the time. 
In Africa it happens, and it’s tragic . . . . In Somalia that happens on 
a daily basis. UNICEF workers are kidnapped. Grenades are 
thrown into compounds . . . . But now that it’s happening in Iraq, 
people will be looking at it through different eyes. 
—Joel Frushone, policy analyst, U.S. Committee of Refugees.1 
**** 
We are waiting for the enemy. We sit here like bait, unarmed, 
waiting for the wave . . . while waiting for the militia to do what 
they have to do; I will draft the agenda for the meeting tomorrow on 
Kapang. The aim of the meeting: to examine how we are going to 
continue this operation. I have to go now. I hear screaming outside.  
—Carlos Caceres, one of the three U.N. staff members who were 
brutally murdered on September 6, 2000 in Atambua, West Timor.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Humanitarian workers provide support to those who lose their homes to 
war and poverty, medical attention to those who are injured, food to those 
who are hungry, and an education and possibility of a future to children 
who lose everything. However, humanitarian workers are consistently 
encumbered by the overwhelming problems that confront them daily.3 
Wars often operate without rules, without mercy, and without humanity. 
Civilians are targeted, homes burned, and chaos ensues. In a world where 
 1. Humanitarian Protection, JOURNAL NEWS, Aug. 31, 2003, at 6B, available at 2003 WL 
61788726 (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). Hundreds of United Nations and other humanitarian workers 
have been killed in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Chechnya, Liberia, and Sudan, as well as other 
countries. 
 2. Nuchhi Currier, “Protecting the Protectors”; Strengthening Staff Security: Priorities and 
Challenges, 2003(2) U.N. CHRON. ONLINE ED. 5, June–Aug. 2003, at http://www.un.org/Pubs/ 
chronicle/2003/issue2/0203p5.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).  
 3. See Mani Sheik et al., Deaths Among Humanitarian Workers, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 166 (2000). 
For example, humanitarian workers face violence, motor vehicle accidents, and disease. The authors 
reported the causes of death of 375 civilian U.N. and non-governmental organization aid workers and 
peacekeepers who died between 1985 and 1998. The high number of intentional deaths (253) 
compared to road accident fatalities (64) reflects the increasingly violent conditions that aid workers 
face on a daily basis. Id. at 166. 
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far too many states are embroiled in internal conflict, humanitarian 
workers play an indispensable role.4  
The U.N. Security Council relies on humanitarian workers to help ease 
human suffering and strife.5 Accordingly, humanitarian workers must be 
able to proceed with their work without being threatened and attacked by 
those around them.6 However, humanitarian workers are increasingly 
becoming victims in the countries where they lend aid and support.7  
 4. See infra note 5.  
 5. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (defining one of the primary purposes of the United Nations as 
the maintenance of international peace and security); U.N. CHARTER art. 14 (mandating the General 
Assembly to “recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation . . . which it deems 
likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations”).  
 Peacekeeping missions often are described as being “‘born out of necessity’ . . . to stop hostilities 
or control conflicts by monitoring cease fires and acting as a buffer between disputing parties.” Brian 
D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying International, Humanitarian Law to United 
Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 61, 76–77 (1997) (citing a number of guidelines that 
have since emerged with respect to “formation, structure, and operation” of peacekeeping forces). See 
also David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 
253, 265 (1992) (defining humanitarian “intervention”).  
 The purposes of humanitarian “intervention” include: 
(1) To rescue or protect citizens abroad and other aliens whose lives are at risk. (2) To protect 
religious or ethnic minorities from genocide or violent oppression. (3) To end internal 
aggression or human rights atrocities. (4) To contain mass migration of people, to return large 
numbers of displaced people to their rightful homes, to repatriate large numbers of refugees 
and other migrants or to protect refugees and migrants from life-threatening circumstances. 
(5) To respond to mass human suffering caused by man-made or natural disasters. (6) To 
support anti-totalitarian rebellions or other movements of self-determination struggling for 
independence from oppressive regimes that violate human rights on a large scale. 
Id.  
 6. Members of the Security Council stressed the necessity of exploring how the Council could 
work with other U.N. organs to “evolve mechanisms to ensure that an initial deployment eventually 
led to a permanent peace.” Press Release, U.N. SCOR., Security Council Discusses Ways to Improve 
Support for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Aug. 28, 2003), 58th Sess., 4818th mtg. at 1, 
U.N. Doc. SC/7860.  
 7. Lijeanne Lee, Aid Workers Fight Other Kinds of War, CAP. NEWS ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2003), at 
http://temagami.carleton.ca/jmc/cnews/04042003/n2.shtml (last visited Aug. 31, 2004). Secretary-
General Kofi Annan explained that  
[w]hat is unacceptable and really appalling is that these young men and women who go to 
these areas to help—to assist—then become targets. They are not at war with anyone. They 
went because they wanted to help, they went because they have compassion, they went 
because they understand the human condition and want to do whatever they can to help. It is 
unforgivable that these human beings would then become targets of either rebels or 
government forces which are at war with each other. 
Id.  
 The International Community of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted the following trends in the previous 
nine years:  
the number of incidents involving a physical threat to our staff has increased from about 20 a 
year to over 100 (153 in 1996); banditry and threats of various kinds were involved in 10% of 
incidents in 1990 and as many as 50% in 1996; and cases in which the ICRC has been 
deliberately targeted have increased steadily, from 3% to 20%. 
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Despite the legal protections afforded by international agreements, 
such as the Geneva Conventions on the Law of War (Geneva 
Conventions),8 the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel (Safety Convention),9 and the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute),10 the perpetrators of violence 
against humanitarian workers are rarely prosecuted.11 For example, from 
January 1992 to April 2003, 220 civilian U.N. staff members were killed, 
but only twenty-two offenders have been brought to justice as of June 
2003.12 In response, on August 26, 2003, with the passage of Security 
Council Resolution 1502, the United Nations attempted to strike a balance 
between maintaining humanitarian organizations’ neutrality in the eyes of 
the world and ensuring their safety while in the field.13  
After the August 19, 2003 bombing of the U.N. mission headquarters in 
Baghdad, Iraq,14 the fifteen-member Security Council unanimously 
See Paul Grossrieder, Protecting the Protectors, International Committee of the Red Cross Delegation 
to the United Nations and New York University School of Law, 15th Annual Seminar for Diplomats 
on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 28, 1998), at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/ 
57JP2C (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).  
 Significantly, between January 1994 and October 2002, seventy-four incidents involving hostage-
taking or kidnapping involved 262 humanitarian workers and as of October 2002, thirty-nine U.N. 
personnel were still in detention at various locations throughout the world. See Currier, supra note 2.  
 8. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3361, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
 9. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec. 9, 1994, 34 
I.L.M. 482, available at http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm [hereinafter Safety Convention]. 
 10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II, 
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 11. Initially, attacks on humanitarian workers were considered domestic crimes and the 
perpetrators were presumably prosecuted under the criminal laws of the host state. However, this was 
problematic, because the “law enforcement capabilities of a state requiring outside forces for internal 
stability are generally insufficient to investigate, try, and prosecute persons for such crimes.” Siobhan 
Wills, The Need for Effective Protection of United Nations Peacekeepers: The Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 10(2) HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/10/2peacekeepers.cfm?&print_page=1 (last visited Sept. 16, 
2004).  
 12. See Currier, supra note 2, at 7–8. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated, “[i]t is 
particularly troubling that so few perpetrators have been prosecuted for crimes against United Nations 
staff. The swift application of justice would be a real deterrent against such impunity.” Id. 
 13. S.C. Res. 1502, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4814th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1502 (2003), 
available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/478/02/PDF/N0347802.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2004).  
 14. In a Press Statement after the August 19, 2003 attack on the U.N. Mission in Baghdad, “[t]he 
Security Council reaffirm[ed] its determination to assist the Iraqi people to build peace and justice in 
their country and to determine their own political future by themselves.” Press Release, U.N. SCOR, 
Condemnation of Terrorist Attack Against U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad (Aug. 20, 2003), U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2003/13.  
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adopted Resolution 1502.15 Resolution 1502 states that “attacks knowingly 
and intentionally directed against” humanitarian or peacekeeping 
personnel “constitute war crimes.”16 The Resolution condemns “murder, 
rape and sexual assault, intimidation, armed robbery, abduction, hostage-
taking, kidnapping, harassment and illegal arrest and detention to which 
[humanitarian or peacekeeping personnel] participating in humanitarian 
operations are increasingly exposed, as well as attacks on humanitarian 
convoys and acts of destruction and looting of their property.”17 The 
Resolution was, in large part, an answer to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan’s plea to bring to justice those who attack innocent, unarmed 
civilian humanitarian workers, because “impunity for those who commit 
such unpardonable crimes cannot stand.”18  
 15. S.C. Res. 1502, supra note 13. China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States are permanent members of the Security Council. The ten non-permanent 
members are selected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, with five members being replaced 
each year. The ten non-permanent members for 2003–2004 were: Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, 
Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, and Syria. United Nations Security Council Members, 
available at http://www.un.org/DOLS/sc/unsc_members.html. 
 16. S.C. Res. 1502, supra note 13, pmbl.; see also S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 
4814th mtg. ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (2003), available at http://ods-dds/ny.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356391.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2004) (“[u]nequivocally 
condemn[ing]” terrorist attacks against multiple targets from August 7, 2003, through October 14, 
2003, which included the Baghdad bombing of U.N. headquarters, the murder of a Spanish diplomat, 
and the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi).  
 Resolution 1502 was originally proposed last spring by Mexico, but was revived one week after a 
suicide truck bomber devastated the U.N. mission in Baghdad, Iraq. The suicide truck bomber killed 
twenty-three people, including eighteen U.N. staff members and the mission’s leader, Sergio Vieira de 
Mello. Tim Cornwell, 20 Die As Suicide Bomber Destroys U.N. Base, THE SCOTSMAN (Aug. 20, 
2003), at http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=913632003 (last visited Oct. 22, 2004). 
Resolution 1502 was sponsored by Mexico, France, Germany, Russia, Bulgaria, and Syria. S.C. Res. 
1502, supra note 13. 
 17. SC Res. 1502, supra note 13, ¶ 1. 
 18. Protection of U.N. Personnel, Associated Personnel and Humanitarian Personnel in Conflict 
Zones, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4814th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4814 (2003). At the voting meeting 
for Resolution 1502, Security-General Kofi Annan stated:  
I can think of no issue about which I feel more strongly as Secretary-General—and I believe 
none should be more important to each member of the Security Council—than the safety of 
those brave men and women who serve the Organization in the places where it matters most, 
that is, in zones of conflict and danger.  
 It is of course a fact of life that much of our work is done in dangerous places, since that 
is where it is most sorely needed. But that only strengthens the obligation on all of us to take 
every step in our power to protect those working under the blue flag and to bring to justice 
those who attack or harm them. Regrettably, in recent years we have not lived up to that 
obligation. Attacks on humanitarian workers and on United Nations personnel have increased 
alarmingly. Again and again, peacekeepers or unarmed civilians who have voluntarily gone in 
to help their fellow men and women have been deliberately targeted by armed factions 
seeking to make a political point or a military gain or to intimidate the international 
community.  
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Mexico, the sponsor of Resolution 1502, avoided a potential conflict 
with the United States by agreeing to eliminate a reference to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).19 The ICC is a newly-established, 
standing war crimes tribunal,20 to which the Bush Administration is 
strongly opposed.21 The deletion of the ICC reference was needed to 
ensure the unanimity of the Resolution, because “[t]he message to the 
international community and to the perpetrators cannot be affirmed if the 
resolution is not adopted unanimously.”22 Significantly, however, due to 
the removal of the ICC reference, if the country where the crimes occur 
declines to prosecute the offenders, then the U.N. must set up a special 
tribunal in order to do so.23  
Last week’s vicious attack on our headquarters in Baghdad, with all its tragic consequences, 
has brought that vital issue to the forefront of our priorities. It shows us what we must expect 
if we allow the impression to continue gaining ground that international workers are a soft, 
cost-free target.  
Id. at 2. 
 Before the vote, the Secretary-General urged members of the Council: 
[T]o adopt the timely draft resolution before you. I hope very much that you will pass it 
unanimously and that you will follow it up with action. In so doing, you will send an 
unambiguous message to all those who mistakenly believe that, in today’s turbulent world, 
they can advance their cause by targeting the servants of humanity. And if you succeed in 
strengthening the security of United Nations staff, you will not only do what, in all 
conscience, is your duty; you will also increase the authority and effectiveness of the Council 
by making clear that you are determined to protect those whom you send into the field to 
implement your decisions.  
Id.  
 19. Id. at 4. The contested passage in Resolution 1502 merely stated that attacks against 
humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers were war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC. This 
passage was deleted from the final version of Resolution 1502. Id. 
 20. The U.S. opposes the ICC because it fears that it could result in frivolous prosecutions of 
U.S. soldiers or officials, including the President. Although more than one hundred countries have 
signed and ratified the Rome Statute that established the ICC, the United States is not alone in its lack 
of support for the tribunal. China, Japan, India, Saudia Arabia and Pakistan have not signed the Rome 
Treaty, while Russia, Iran, Egypt, and Syria have signed but not ratified it. See Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, at 
http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).  
 21. For a discussion on U.S. opposition to the International Criminal Court, see Leila Nadya 
Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 381, 447–57 (2000). The most important U.S. objection to the ICC centers around the claim of the 
ICC to jurisdiction over non-party states. The ICC’s presumption of power over non-state parties, in 
the view of the United States, does not correspond with customary international law, where 
international treaties only bind those who are state parties to the treaty or convention. Id. 
 22. Felicity Barringer, U.N. Condemns Attacks on Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at A10 
(quoting Mexican ambassador, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser). 
 23. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
827, 3217th mtg. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc S/RES/827 (1993); Statute for the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 8 U.N.T.S. 279; 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 
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Part I of this Recent Development explains why humanitarian workers 
are subject to attacks in the very states they are sent to serve and protect. 
Part II explores the previous resolutions and conventions condemning 
attacks against humanitarian workers. Part III analyzes the effectiveness of 
Resolution 1502. 
I. HUMANITARIAN WORKERS: “SOFT TARGETS” 
Humanitarian intervention existed as early as the nineteenth century, 
and the need for humanitarian missions has certainly grown since that 
time.24 Those who advocate these humanitarian missions, however, are 
faced with a grave dilemma, because the desire to help those in need 
through humanitarian missions25 is met with conditions so unsafe that 
these missions in some instances become infeasible.26 The U.N. Security 
Bevans 20. 
 24. See generally David J. Scheffer, Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention, 
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 253 (1992) (providing a comprehensive examination of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention); T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of 
Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2002) (elaborating a justification for 
humanitarian intervention); Stephen Dycus & Barry Kellman, International Law and National 
Security, 35 INT’L LAW. 811 (2001) (giving examples of where humanitarian missions have been 
necessary). 
 25. The main goal of peacekeeping missions is to ensure normal living conditions for people in 
the countries where they are sent. See supra note 5 (discussing what peacekeeping missions are 
designed to achieve).  
 26. For example, in Somalia in 1994, the United States pulled their humanitarian aid workers out 
of the country. Art Pine, U.S. Troops to Safeguard U.N. Evaluation From Somalia, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
17, 1994, at A6. 
 “Most notably, in Timor-Leste (previously known as East Timor) in September 1999, human 
rights workers, journalists, and eventually the U.N. was forced to evacuate the province after repeated 
attacks by militia and members of the security forces.” Indonesia: Protecting the Protectors: Human 
Rights Defenders and Humanitarian Workers in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, AMNESTY INT’L 9 (June 
3, 2003), AI Index: ASA 21/024/2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA210242003 
?open&of=ENG-IDN (last visited Oct. 16, 2004). Evacuations, however, are a “last resort”—an 
estimated 1,300 people were killed in Timor-Leste during 1999, but most of the killings occurred after 
the evacuation of the humanitarian workers. Id.  
 For a personal account of an evacuation, see I.A.R. (Psychologist in Sierra Leone), An Evacuation 
from Sierra Leone, in SHARING THE FRONT LINE AND THE BACK HILLS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORS 
AND PROVIDERS: PEACEKEEPERS, HUMANITARIAN AID WORKERS AND THE MEDIA IN THE MIDST OF 
CRISIS 222 (Yael Danieli ed., 2002).  
Only then do we realize that it is really an evacuation and not just a stay at Conakry until 
things quiet down, and that we shall not be back soon, as we had thought. When we were 
leaving, we had even said, “. . . see you Tuesday or Wednesday” to the psychology program 
assistant . . . we have plenty of time to imagine what could happen if the rebels take 
Freetown, and to think about those who were left behind. The children in the therapy groups 
are already suffering greatly; how will they survive another trauma? Will people be able to 
protect themselves? What chance do the girls in the team have of avoiding being raped if the 
rebels break into their houses? We are afraid for them. Our worries are fed by memories of 
the accounts told by patients already in our care. We have a whole sleepless night to imagine 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/8
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Council has condemned the violence stating, “again and again, 
peacekeepers, who had voluntarily gone to help their fellow men and 
women, ha[ve] been deliberately targeted by armed factions seeking to 
make a political point or a military gain, or to intimidate the international 
community.”27  
There are several possible explanations as to why humanitarian 
workers are increasingly becoming victims of violence. First, the foreign 
presence may be unwanted and the violence can force these “unwanted” 
organizations to leave, as was the case in Somalia28 and Baghdad.29 
Second, violence discredits the occupying coalition by displaying its 
the worst, which is certainly going to happen.  
 And then the feeling of guilt at the moment of leaving, goodbye to the ideals of 
humanitarian aid. We are leaving because things could turn nasty. Of course we know that 
nothing would be gained by staying behind and that it could even put the whole Sierra Leone 
team in danger; that it is not our country. We are happy to climb into the helicopter, sure, but 
the anguish and feelings of guilt are still there. In the future, there will always be a “before” 
and an “after” the evacuation, when we speak of our mission in Sierra Leone. 
Id. 
 27. Press Release, Security Council Expresses Strong Condemnation of Violence Against 
Humanitarian Workers, Calls for Action to Ensure their Safety, Resolution 1502 (2003) Adopted 
Unanimously (Aug. 26, 2003), U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4814th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/7856, available at 
http://www.un.org/News?Press/docs/2003/SC7856.doc.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).  
 Tragic examples of this violence abound. For instance “on March 30, 2003, a water supply 
engineer with the International Committee of the Red Cross was shot by unidentified assailants in 
Afghanistan.” Currier, supra note 2, at 5. In October 2003, Dr. Annelena Tonelli was brutally 
assassinated in Somalia as she left her hospital. Dr. Nils Daulaire, Line Fusing Between Non-
combatant Aid Workers and Politics, 124 GLOBAL HEALTH LINK 2 (Nov–Dec. 2003), at 
http://www.globalhealth.org/publications.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2004). Dr. Tonelli “had devoted the 
past 33 years to working with the sick and dispossessed in Somalia and Kenya. She had campaigned 
against female genital mutilation and founded a TB hospital . . . in Somaliland.” Id.  
 In October 2003, the attack on the Red Cross headquarters in Baghdad took the lives of two Red 
Cross workers and other innocent bystanders. The Red Cross has since evacuated from Baghdad. Jane 
Darby, Field Under Fire, Humanitarian Workers Become Soft Targets, 124 GLOBAL HEALTH LINK 4, 
4 (Nov.–Dec. 2003), at http://www.globalhealth.org/publications.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2004). 
 Arjen Erkel, a volunteer with Doctors Without Borders, was kidnapped on August 12, 2002 in the 
Russian republic of Dagestan, and remains a hostage today. This brings the number to ten 
humanitarian workers kidnapped in the Northern Caucasus since 1999. Id. 
 Unfortunately, in the words of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “We, who had assumed that 
our mission to help others served as its own and ultimate form of protection, now find ourselves 
threatened and exposed. We who have tried from the beginning to serve those targeted by violence and 
destruction, have become targets ourselves.” Id. (quoting Secretary-General Kofi Annan). 
 28. Grossrieder, supra note 7. For example, during the year 2000, armed conflicts stretched 
across the African continent in Angola, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, and along the border between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Civilians and humanitarian workers were also victimized in these conflicts as 
rebel forces refused to disarm and demobilize. 
 29. See Humanitarian Protection, supra note 1. After the explosion of the suicide truck bomb in 
Baghdad that prompted Resolution 1502, the British international relief agency, Oxfam, withdrew its 
fifteen workers from Iraq. The International Red Cross reduced its personnel in Iraq and the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund ordered their entire staffs to leave. Id.  
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inability to protect civilians.30 Third, humanitarian organizations are often 
targeted for the supplies they transport.31 Fourth, where the objective is to 
obliterate a particular group (ethnic or otherwise), impartial humanitarian 
intervention is difficult to achieve.32 Fifth, “humanitarian action . . . is 
often perceived as promoting undesirable Western values . . . ,” or, in a 
related vein, may be viewed as military operations with intentions of 
conquest under the guise of a “humanitarian mission.”33 Finally, as the 
civilian population becomes a target in armed conflicts, humanitarian 
workers are inevitably exposed to danger due to their position on the front-
lines.34 
Over the past few years, humanitarian agencies began training staff 
members to prepare them for the unsafe environment of humanitarian 
missions.35 For example, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has 
 30. See Darby, supra note 27, at 5. Unarmed humanitarian workers are easy targets. Harming 
them captures world attention because “it signals a disruption of the system and demonstrates to the 
population that there is no way to protect a humanitarian mandate that is built on decency and 
acceptance of that mandate by all parties.” Id.  
 For example, the killing of humanitarian worker Bettina Goislard in the center of Ghazni, 
Afghanistan on November 16, 2003 gave the message to the community that “if it can happen in 
Ghazni, it can happen anywhere.” Crispin Thorold, Afghanistan’s Fearful Aid Community, BBC 
NEWS, Nov. 17, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-i/1/hi/world/south_asia/3278279.stm (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2004).  
 31. Grossrieder, supra note 7, at 2. “With all the relief supplies they handle and the resources at 
their disposal, humanitarian agencies make particularly tempting targets.” Id.  
 32. Id. Humanitarian workers may be attacked simply because they are inconvenient witnesses to 
massacres or to “ethnic cleansing.” Humanitarian efforts to protect and assist all victims runs counter 
to attempts to exterminate or drive out a certain group. For a discussion of “ethnic cleansing,” see 
MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA (2002).  
 33. Grossrieder, supra note 7, at 2–3. Because humanitarian workers are unarmed, they must rely 
on the good will of the communities they are in for their safety. It is their reputation for “neutrality and 
impartiality” that traditionally provides safety. Unfortunately, government officials have contributed to 
the blurring of the lines between combatants and non-combatants. For example, in Afghanistan, U.S. 
warplanes dropped humanitarian rations and cluster bombs, both of which were in yellow packaging. 
At the same time, NGOs, which Secretary of State Colin Powell has referred to as “force multipliers” 
for the military, have worked closely with the United States Small units of U.S. military forces in 
Afghanistan wear civilian clothing and claim to undertake “humanitarian” work. This blurring between 
military and humanitarian missions is an important reason for the increase in violence against aid 
workers. Kevin Henry, Confused Roles Put Aid Workers at Risk, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 
21, 2004, at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/157373_care21.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).  
 It is no wonder that the Taliban, who claimed responsibility for the recent attacks on employees of 
international aid groups in Afghanistan, said the following:  
Our government has always respected the people who are working in NGOs that really want 
to build Afghanistan. But there is another kind of NGO, which only uses the name NGO but 
is actually working and spying for the U.S. We advise Taliban all over the country to attack 
them and extradite them from Afghanistan.  
Darby, supra note 27, at 5.  
 34. Grossrieder, supra note 7. See also Daulaire, supra note 27. 
 35. UN/NGO Security Collaboration Recommendations to the Inter-Agency Steering Committee, 
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started to give yearly in-depth security training to two staff members in 
each of their programs; the staff members then return to their countries to 
train their colleagues in security management.36 In addition, IRC has hired 
a global security advisor, to be based at IRC headquarters in New York, 
whose responsibilities include reviewing security plans, training staff, and 
warning workers about “hotspots.”37  
U.N. OHHI, 58th Sess. (Jan. 18, 2003), at http://www.hiciraq.org/services/security/reports/ 
index_txt.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Recommendations]. The Recommendations 
outline security standards for field work. It is thought that the Recommendations will help in Iraq by 
“(1) serv[ing] as an instructive reminder on security to all agencies operational in Iraq; (2) set[ting] an 
example for NGOs to develop or (re)familiarise themselves with their own guidelines; and (3) 
institut[ing] a level of complementarity between UN and NGO security measures.” Id.  
 The Recommendations address the following areas: 
 1: Convening fora for field security collaboration between UN organizations and their 
IGO/NGO partners 
 2: Including staff security concerns of UN organizations and their IGO/NGO partners in 
the CAP 
 3: Meeting common security-related needs 
 4: Sharing resources 
 5: Collaborating in security planning between UN organizations and their IGO/NGO 
partners 
 6: Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication 
 7: Sharing information 
 8: Collaborating and consulting in security training 
 9: Identifying minimum security standards 
 10: Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground-rules. 
UN/NGO Recommendations, app. (Jan. 18, 2002), at http://www.hiciraq.org/download/Brief%20-
%20UN-NGO%20Security%20Collaboration%20Recommedations%20-%2018Jan02.doc (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2004). 
 36. Darby, supra note 27, at 5–6. However, despite changes in security management, security 
continues to remain the single greatest concern for agencies such as Save the Children, which 
“operates one of the largest private relief efforts in Iraq, providing food, water, cooking fuel, shelter, 
medicines and other basic necessities for thousands of Iraqi children and their families.” Id. at 6. Save 
the Children officials said:  
In every conflict situation, we assess the risks vs. the needs. In Iraq, we do so on almost a 
daily basis. There are three major questions we ask ourselves in responding to conflict 
situations: First, are children in need? Second, is there support for our efforts? And third, is it 
safe for us to work?  
Id. at 6.  
 To address the security issue, Save the Children has “developed security standards and procedures 
as part of a comprehensive security plan . . .” and “hired a full time security manager who is based at 
their regional office . . . , and [works] to establish good relations with community leaders.” Id. Save 
the Children officials also said: “We believe that demonstrating to Iraqi citizens and community 
leaders that we are there to help the Iraqi people help themselves will do the most to help us become 
accepted within the community.” Id. at 6–7. 
 37. Id. at 6. “Our security training is geared toward making people smart, using common sense, 
and teaching them what to do in case they find themselves in a bad situation, and who to talk to in the 
event of a problem.” Id. 
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The U.N.-instituted Minimum Operational Security Standards 
(MOSS)38 help determine the minimum requirements for field security and 
provide a mechanism by which security consciousness may be increased.39 
In addition, the Office of the U.N. Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) 
focuses on strengthening “security coordination and management” and on 
“increasing the efficacy of the security management system.”40  
However, the Baghdad bombing demonstrates that “training alone is 
insufficient to protect against deliberate and targeted attacks.”41 Thus, the 
question remains as to how to ensure the security of the protectors. 
 38. Currier, supra note 2, at 6. “MOSS is a fundamental policy document for all UN field 
operations. It was developed in response to the United Nations requirement to ensure that minimal 
essential security practices are established and maintained in the delivery of security support to United 
Nations staff.” Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS): Instructions for Implementation, at 
http://www.hiciraq.org/download/Guidelines%20-%20New%20MOSS%20Instruction%20Paper%20-
%2012%20Nov%2002.doc (last visited Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter MOSS]. 
 The five steps required in the development of country-specific MOSS are as follows: 
 Step 1: Conduct a Threat Assessment and determine the level of Risk. Confirm Security 
Phases. 
 Step 2: Compare the United Nation’s current, extant security measures in each security 
Phase against those required in the baseline MOSS, and determine shortfalls. 
 Step 3: Identify what additional measures are required above the requirements of baseline 
MOSS, if any. 
 Step 4: Once all MOSS requirements have been considered and documented, the table 
should be completed in the format of Annex A. The SMT then concur to the country-specific 
MOSS and forward it to UNSECOORD for review. 
 Step 5: UNSECOORD will authorise the country-specific MOSS. The MOSS is 
implemented at the country level with equipment obtained and installed, with training 
undertaken and structures put in place. 
Id. 
 39. Currier, supra note 2, at 8.  
MOSS is divided into four sections: security planning, training of staff, telecommunications 
and security equipment. Its purpose for each duty station is to review the various country-
specific threats and their associated risks, using a standardized threat-assessment system to 
help determine the safety measures undertaken to enable staff to operate effectively and 
safely . . . .  
Id.  
 40. Id. at 8. UNSECOORD is helping countries implement MOSS. The United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food Programme (WFP) are all assisting in the implementation of 
greater security management for humanitarian missions. Id. 
 41. Darby, supra note 27, at 6.  
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II. BEFORE RESOLUTION 1502 THERE WAS ROME, GENEVA, AND HIGH 
HOPES OF SAFETY 
Many prior resolutions, conventions, and treaties condemn attacks 
against humanitarian workers. This Recent Development will only 
examine the Geneva Conventions, including Protocol I, the Rome Statute 
establishing the ICC, and the Safety Convention.42 These international 
agreements are earlier sources of the prohibitions mentioned in Resolution 
1502.43  
A. Geneva Conventions and Protocol I 
As a general rule, “protected persons” under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions include persons not taking a direct part in the hostilities, such 
as prisoners of war, the wounded and/or sick, and innocent civilians.44 
Under Protocol I, civilians are given specific protections in that they “shall 
not be the object of attack.”45 Because humanitarian workers are often 
civilians (e.g. doctors, lawyers, psychologists), Protocol I provides them 
with protections from attacks during the course of their field mission. In 
addition, Protocol I states that “attacks shall be limited strictly to military 
objectives.”46 Accordingly, under Protocol I, attacks against civilians (e.g. 
humanitarian workers) constitute war crimes.47  
 42. See supra notes 8–10. 
 43. Id. Both the Hague Convention and the U.N. Charter provide additional sources for the 
prohibitions found in Resolution 1502. For example, the U.N. Charter provides that U.N. personnel 
must enjoy “such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions.” U.N. CHARTER art. 105, para. 2. The Hague Conventions regulate the means and methods 
of warfare and protect civilians from unlawful attacks. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.  
 44. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 12, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949, art. 36–40, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]. 
 45. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating To The 
Protection Of Victims Of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 6(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 
available at http://www.unog.ch/disarm/distreat/prt_gen.html. (last visited on Sept. 8, 2004) 
[hereinafter Protocol I].  
 46. Id. art. 52, para. 2.  
 47. Id. art. 85, paras. 3(a), 5. The United States objected to certain provisions found in Protocol I. 
Mohamed Elewa, Genocide at the Safe Area of Srebrenica: A Search for a New Strategy for 
Protecting Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 10 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 429, 462–63 (2001). 
While the United States is not a party to the Protocol, the provisions are widely regarded as customary 
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Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians are protected from the 
beginning of any international armed conflict or occupation until one year 
after the general close of military operations in any situation and “in any 
manner whatsoever” that they may find themselves in the hands of a party 
to the conflict or occupying power.48 Therefore, humanitarian workers, 
who remain in the state a year after the close of military operations, 
continue to be protected under the Geneva Conventions. Significantly, 
under article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, civilians are entitled to 
be humanely treated and protected from all acts of violence.49  
However, under the Third Geneva Convention and Protocol I, prisoners 
can be held until the end of the conflict.50 Thus, humanitarian workers may 
be captured and prevented from providing aid and support to the 
communities that require aid during times when the communities may 
need it most. Additionally, Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions provides protection only when the Geneva Conventions 
apply—during declared wars or other armed conflicts and occupations.51  
B. Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute identifies a war crime as “intentionally directing 
attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved 
in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law 
of armed conflict.”52 Much like the Geneva Conventions, under the Rome 
Statute the conduct must take place during an “armed conflict” to 
constitute a war crime by the ICC.53 Thus, hypothetically speaking, the 
international law, as evidenced by the number of states that have ratified the Protocol. ICRC, States 
Party To The Geneva Conventions And Their Additional Protocols, at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/ 
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/party_gc/$file/Conventions%20de%20GenSve%20et%20Protocoles%20additiona
nnels%20ENG-logo.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). Because Resolution 1502 advocates the same legal 
status for humanitarian workers, it appears that its provisions would tend to strengthen this view. S.C. 
Res. 1502, supra note 13. 
 48. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 6.  
 49. Id. art. 27.  
 50. Art. 118 of the Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners “shall be released and 
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.” Third Geneva Convention, supra 
note 44, art. 118. 
 51. Id. art. 2. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44, art. 2; First Geneva 
Convention, supra note 44, art. 2; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 44, art. 2. 
 52. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 8, para. 2(b)(iii).  
 53. Id. art. 8, paras. 2(b) (international armed conflict), and 2(e)(iii) (armed conflict not on 
international scale). 
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determination as to whether or not Iraq was in a state of “armed conflict” 
on August 19, 2003 would determine if the bombers of the U.N. Mission 
Headquarters could be prosecuted as war criminals under the Rome 
Statute.54  
Additionally, ICC jurisdictional problems complicate the process of 
bringing the perpetrators of war crimes directed against humanitarian 
personnel to justice. ICC jurisdiction can be exercised over the 
perpetrators if the crime was committed in the territory of a state party to 
the Rome Statute, or by a national of a state party.55 However, Iraq (the 
territory where the crime was committed, conceivably by its nationals) is 
not a state party to the Rome Statute.56  
ICC jurisdiction can also be established if either the territorial state or 
the state of the accused’s nationality, though not a party to the Rome 
Statute, makes a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crime in question.57 However, the United States, the current 
occupying power in Iraq, is not likely to accept ICC jurisdiction because 
of its strong opposition to it.58 Accordingly, the bombers of the U.N. 
Mission Headquarters in Baghdad cannot be tried before the ICC. 
Where the perpetrators are not nationals of a state party to the ICC, nor 
are their crimes committed on the territory of a state party, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction may only be exercised when the U.N. Security Council refers 
such a case to the ICC.59 This is extremely unlikely to occur in the case of 
the Baghdad bombing because the United States opposes the ICC and 
possesses a veto power that it would certainly employ in order to block 
referral of such a case.60 
C. Safety Convention 
The Safety Convention was drafted61 in response to attacks on U.N. 
personnel.62 It applies to forces conducting non-combat operations on 
 54. Though, it should be noted, that the ICC would not take jurisdiction in any case because 
neither state was an ICC party and the ICC’s jurisdiction is non-retroactive. Rome Statute, supra note 
10, arts. 11, 12. 
 55. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 12, para. 2. 
 56. Rome Statute Signature and Ratification Chart, supra note 20. 
 57. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 12, para. 3. 
 58. For a discussion on why the U.S. opposes the ICC, see Sadat & Carden, supra note 21, at 
447–57. 
 59. Rome Statute, supra note 10, arts. 12, 13.  
 60. Sadat & Carden, supra note 21, at 447–57. 
 61. Safety Convention, supra note 9.  
 62. For example, on June 5, 1993, Somalis killed twenty-four members of a U.N. operation and 
wounded another fifty-seven. The following day, the Security Council passed Resolution 837, which 
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behalf of the U.N. and establishes a legal norm of protecting workers.63 
The Safety Convention incorporates the principle of universal jurisdiction 
over offenses directed against U.N. and associated personnel and requires 
prosecution or extradition of perpetrators.64  
The convention also creates obligations on its states party. Article 7 
states that U.N. personnel may not be attacked or prevented from 
accomplishing their mission65 and requires parties to take measures to 
ensure the safety of U.N. personnel.66 Article 9 requires that parties 
criminalize under national law attacks against the U.N. and its associated 
personnel.67 The Safety Convention provides specific protections for 
captured U.N. personnel by requiring that such persons be immediately 
released once their identity is established. In addition, while being held, 
U.N. personnel may not be interrogated68 and, “[p]ending their release 
such personnel shall be treated in accordance with universally recognized 
standards of human rights and the principles and spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.”69  
Unfortunately, the Safety Convention is unlikely to be useful in the 
present situation in Iraq.70 First, because Iraq is not a party to the Safety 
authorized U.N. forces to “take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed 
attacks . . . including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for 
prosecution . . . .” S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg., para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 
(1993).  
 63. See Mjr. Michael A. Newton, United Nations Convention on the Safety of United Nations 
(UN) and Associated personnel Enters Into Force, 315 ARMY LAW. 21, 23 n.76 (1999) (citing a 
United States Mission to the U.N. Press Release which notes that the Convention represents an 
“important element” in protecting persons deployed on operations involving “exceptional risk.”). 
 64. See Safety Convention, supra note 9, art. 10. Universal jurisdiction is a form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that can be exercised by a domestic court for crimes that occurred abroad. 
The multilateral Convention grants every state party to the Convention jurisdiction over an attack on 
U.N. or associated personnel engaged in a U.N. operation when (a) the crime is committed in that 
state’s territory, (b) the alleged offender is a national of that state, (c) the alleged offender, though 
stateless, resides in that state, (d) a victim is a national of that state, or (e) the attack was an attempt to 
compel that state to do or abstain from doing any act. Id. art. 10. 
 65. Id. art. 7, para. 1. 
 66. Id. art. 7, para. 2. 
 67. Id. art. 9, para. 2. The Convention has several provisions that detail the crimes punishable 
under article 9. The Convention also requires nations to establish jurisdiction over crimes committed: 
in the nation; on a ship or airplane registered to the nation; or by a resident of the nation. Id. art. 10, 
para. 1. The Convention urges participating nations to attempt to prevent crimes against U.N. and 
associated personnel by “[t]aking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective 
territories for the commission of those crimes” and exchanging information with other nations. Id. art. 
11. Articles 13, 14, and 15 attempt to ensure that alleged criminals are held for prosecution or 
extradition and are actually prosecuted or extradited for their crimes. Id. arts. 13–15.  
 68. Id. art. 8. This differs from the Geneva Conventions, where such personnel would not be 
released until after the conflict ceased. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 69. Safety Convention, supra note 9, art. 8. 
 70. See generally Newton, supra note 63 (presenting an analytical discussion of the Safety 
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Convention,71 its provisions are not binding and as a result it cannot serve 
as authority that would require or authorize prosecution or extradition of 
perpetrators. Second, the attacks were not just against U.N.-associated 
personnel, but were against all humanitarian aid workers, whether they 
worked for the United Nations, the Red Cross, or private organizations. 
Because the Safety Convention only applies to U.N. personnel and a 
tightly defined class of other associated personnel as defined in article 1 its 
protections cannot be afforded to the entire class of victims.72  
Finally, the Safety Convention contains an important limitation73 in 
that it does not apply to a U.N. operation authorized by the Security 
Council as an enforcement action.74 The drafters intended to create a 
“clear separation” between the Safety Convention and the Geneva 
Conventions such that only one or the other would apply in any particular 
situation.75 The result, however, is an unintended void between the two 
conventions that leaves no recourse against the perpetrators in Iraq. 
III. RESOLUTION 1502—DOES IT CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING NEW? 
By unanimously adopting Resolution 1502, the Council expressed its 
determination to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of 
humanitarian and U.N. personnel.76 The Resolution “[e]mphasiz[es] that 
there are existing prohibitions under international law against attacks 
Convention). 
 71. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Convention on the Safety of 
United Nations and Associated Personnel: Participants, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/ 
englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty8.asp (last visited Oct. 22, 2004). 
 72. Safety Convention, supra note 9, art. 1. Article 1 defines “United Nations personnel” in 
article 1(a), and “associated personnel” in article 1(b). The Convention defines associated personnel as 
persons deployed by a government, intergovernmental organization or “a humanitarian non-
governmental organization or agency under an agreement with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations or with a specialized agency. . . to carry out activities in support of the fulfillment of the 
mandate of a United Nations operation.” Id.  
 73. Newton, supra note 63, at 24. 
 74. Safety Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, para. 2. 
 75. Id. at 25. “The drafters, did not intend for both bodies of law to apply at the same time.” Id. 
However, “the problem is that the Geneva Conventions set the threshold for applying the laws of war 
at a deliberately low, subjective threshold to maximize their application” and accordingly, this creates 
the “fatal flaw in the U.N. Safety Convention.” Id. Thus, the broad Safety Convention protections 
afforded to U.N. personnel will not usually apply. Id. 
 76. Care Int’l UK, International Community Must Act Quickly To Enforce New Security Council 
Resolution For Aid Workers, at http://www.careinternational.org.uk/news/media_release.php?id=239 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004). Denis Caillaux, Secretary-General of CARE International stated: “We 
commend the Council for coming to a consensus on this crucial issue, and are especially glad to see 
that they retained the legal basis for prosecuting attacks on humanitarian workers as war crimes.” Id. 
See also S/PV.4814, supra note 18. 
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knowingly and intentionally directed against personnel involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission undertaken in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which in situations of 
armed conflicts constitute war crimes.”77 The Resolution “recall[s] the 
need for States to end impunity for such criminal acts”78 and  
[e]xpresses its strong condemnation of all forms of violence, 
including, inter alia, murder, rape and sexual assault, intimidation, 
armed robbery, abduction, hostage-taking, kidnapping, harassment 
and illegal arrest and detention to which those participating in 
humanitarian operations are increasingly exposed, as well as attacks 
on humanitarian convoys and acts of destruction and looting of their 
property.79 
The Resolution “[u]rges States to ensure that crimes against such 
personnel do not remain unpunished”80 and requests that the Secretary-
General “seek the inclusion of, and that host countries include, key 
provisions of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and its 
Associated Personnel” in their national law.81  
The language of Resolution 1502 imposed no obligations or duties 
upon states not already required by previously existing conventions and 
treaties.82 Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1502 only reaffirms the existing 
obligations of all parties involved in an armed conflict to comply fully 
with the rules and principles of international law.83 Additionally, 
paragraph 4 urges parties to implement their existing international legal 
obligations concerning the promotion of safety, security, and freedom of 
movement of humanitarian workers.84 Moreover, because civilian-attacks 
 77. SC Res. 1502, supra note 13, pmbl. and accompanying text. 
 78. Id. Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “It is, of course, a fact of life that much of our work is 
done in dangerous places, since that is where it is most sorely needed. But that only strengthens the 
obligation on all of us to take every step in our power to protect those working under the blue flag and 
to bring to justice those who attack or harm them.” S/PV.4814, supra note 18, at 2 (statements of the 
Secretary-General). 
 79. SC Res. 1502, supra note 13, para. 1. 
 80. Id. para. 2. 
 81. Id. para. 5(a). Among other things, those provisions concerned the prevention of attacks 
against members of U.N. operations, a reaffirmation that such attacks are crimes punishable by law 
and a commitment to the prosecution or extradition of offenders. Id. 
 82. S/PV.4814, supra note 18, at 3 (statements made by Ambassador Negroponte, United States). 
The Security Council reaffirmed its Resolutions 1296 (2000) and 1265 (1999), which also dealt with 
the protection of civilians in armed conflicts and the protection of United Nations personnel, 
associated personnel, and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones. S.C. Res. 1502, supra note 13, 
pmbl. 
 83. Id. para. 3. 
 84. Id. para. 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/8
p187 Suttenberg book pages.doc2/18/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] CURING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: RESOLUTION 1502 203 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are already considered war crimes by these previous agreements, the 
Resolution does not add anything new to the enforcement and 
prosecutorial powers of states.85 Therefore, the Resolution is simply a re-
statement of international law outlined in the Geneva Conventions, the 
Rome Statute, and the Safety Convention. 
However, the Resolution fills voids in the Geneva Conventions, the 
Rome Statute, and the Safety Convention by broadening the definition of 
“humanitarian workers.” Resolution 1502 does not just apply to those 
humanitarian workers on missions under U.N. mandate, but also provides 
“protection [for] United Nations personnel, associated personnel, and 
humanitarian personnel in conflict zones.”86 The “added factor” of issuing 
a declaration of “exceptional risk” and inviting the Secretary-General to 
advise the Council where circumstances would support such a declaration 
helps to ensure the security and safety of U.N. personnel.87 Therefore, 
Resolution 1502, while imposing precautionary measures on the Security 
Council and potentially broadening the class of protected persons, adds no 
new substantive legal obligations.88 
 85. Id. Although “[a]id agencies welcomed the new resolution,” they have said that “without the 
political will to follow it up—and without a proper mechanism of enforcement—the problem of 
insecurity would not be solved.” Lars Inge Staveland, Aid Groups Divided on U.N. Resolution, 
ALERTNET, Sept. 10, 2003, at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/0045F55070B4BE6849256D9E 
00008DBC (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
 Bjarte Vandvik, director of the international department at the Norwegian Refugee Council, noted 
that the Security Council missed an opportunity to strengthen the authority of international law and the 
ICC. He said:  
We welcome this reminder of existing international law protecting aid workers, but for people 
to respect international law there has to be a mechanism of enforcing it . . . We think it is 
deplorable that the Security Council missed the opportunity to use a concrete international 
tribunal which could have been strengthened by such a resolution. 
Id.  
 86. SC Res. 1502, supra note 13, pmbl. 
 87. SC Res. 1502, supra note 13, para. 5(c). Further, the Security Council requested that the 
Secretary-General address in his “country-specific situation reports the issue of the safety and security 
of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel, including specific acts of 
violence against such personnel, remedial actions taken to prevent similar incidents and actions taken 
to identify and hold accountable those who commit such acts, and to explore and propose additional 
ways and means to enhance the safety and security of such personnel.” Id. para. 6. 
 88. Id. para. 5. Mexico’s Ambassador Aguilar Zinser said that the “added factor” of the 
resolution is that it “provides the capacity to take action. It specifies when and how the secretary 
general has to raise the issue of protection of humanitarian workers so the Security Council takes 
action.” Judy Aita, U.N. Security Council Focuses On Protecting Aid Workers: Resolution Calls 
Attacks on Workers “War Crimes”, WASHINGTON FILE, Aug. 26, 2003, at http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=August&x=20030827083621nosnhojb8.1295
19e-02&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
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CONCLUSION 
Resolution 1502 is the latest international effort to protect humanitarian 
workers89 and its unanimous passage was celebrated among humanitarian 
organizations. Unfortunately, however, while it is a recent reminder of 
laws protecting aid workers, it adds no new substantive obligations.90 
Nor will it ensure the safety of humanitarian workers or lead to the 
prosecution of those who attack humanitarian workers.91 States must, as 
before, provide protection for these workers and in the face of a state’s 
failure to investigate and prosecute attacks on aid workers, it remains 
nearly impossible to bring the offenders to justice. The attacks against 
humanitarian workers will not stop because of a new resolution that is 
simply a restatement of old conventions that were themselves ineffective 
at addressing this crucial dilemma. 
Lindsay Jill Suttenberg* 
 89. As of April 2004, International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) is working with the United 
Nations to extend to journalists the protection of Security Council Resolution 1502. It will be 
interesting to see how far the protections of Resolution 1502 can reach. 
 90. See CARE Int’l UK, supra note 76. 
 91. Aid Doctors Give Up on Afghanistan, CNN.COM, July 28, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/ 
2004/WORLD/asiapcf/07/28/afghanistan.aid/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004). “The killing of 
our own colleagues, together with the government’s failure to arrest the culprits, along with false 
allegations of the Taliban, have led us to come to the regrettable conclusion that it is no longer possible 
for us to work here,” said the Doctors Without Boarders international secretary. In June 2004, the 
group suspended its Afghanistan operations. The international secretary stated that the group was 
“leaving with ‘a sense of mourning’ for its slain workers and for those who ultimately will suffer—
’the sick, the wounded and the needy that will need assistance in Afghanistan.’” Id.  
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